C. I apprehend that however obsolete it is still more rare in these days that the question of Libel or no Libel should be decided by a Judge or by a Jury.
Instead, I have arrived, in which that form is abandoned in amation. In several respects and in particular addressing myself to what has been called the sting of the Libel, there is not a word which could convey to the mind of anyone a notion that any portion of the £2,000 alleged to have found its way to Lisbon had reached the hands of Senhor Ameral as a bribe or money gift to him. The tenor of the whole is indeed that his gratitude towards, his zeal for, his constituents, not any money bribe, had incited him, and that that money was used, not to stimulate his zeal, but to further and aid his efforts as well. Money is used, it may be lawfully, it may be illegally, to carry elections or political measures or railway or canal undertakings in England.
Again, at the end of the alleged Libel, in what is called the second count, occurs this innuendo ("meaning as before alleged of and concerning the Bull. and Leake 2 edit. of 1862 is not still false malicious and defamatory libel firstly hereinbefore set forth"), words which import all the innuendoes or it may be only the last. Mr. Bayllar, for the Defendant, ridiculed the dissection of his plea by Mr. Pollard and submitted that taken as a whole it was a full answer to the information, which he contended consisted in form and in substance of one count only.
But he was less careful to sustain his own plea than to attack the information, which he insisted was bad, for that, taken by themselves, the two articles were simply fair comment on the public conduct of public men in reference to matters of the greatest public interest, and still more by reason that the meaning put on the libel by the innuendoes was such as the language would not and could not bear, and consequently that I must decide against it.
I must say, I strongly incline to think that both counts of the information (if indeed they are so framed as to be two counts, as to which I give no opinion) are bad, and the Attorney General is bound by the meaning he puts on the alleged libel by the innuendoes now; to use the words of the Chief Justice Tindal, it is a clear rule of law that an innuendo cannot introduce a meaning broader than that which the words naturally bear, unless connected with proper introductory averments.
The well-known case of Rex v. Haurkey, 8 East 427, is the best illustration of this rule. Alexander v. Angle in Error 1, Crompton & Jervis 143 and see 5 East 467-469. I incline to think that the innuendocs here do throughout introduce meanings broader than the words bear.
It is unnecessary for me to consider whether any averments could have cured this defect.
It seems to me that the parties have been perplexed by rules of pleading, the Acting Attorney General in reference to his innuendoes and the Defendant as to the particularity of his plea, and especially by Bremridge v. Latimer and days have been wasted in argument when any common sense procedure could and would have easily defined—nobody doubted the real issue between the parties with certainty and precision.
The English pleading procedure has been abandoned everywhere under British Rule in Asia except in this Colony. In India, another system prevails, and for the Consular Courts of China and Japan, the Foreign Office has wisely prescribed a system of admirable rules as to procedure which simplifies the preliminary process.
It seems to me that the words of the alleged libel are incapable of the meaning ascribed to them in the innuendoes in the information.
C. I apprehend that however obsolete
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be it is still more rare in these da
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rived, in which that form is abandoned in amation. In several respects and in particular plea to an action for damages on the autho-addressing myself to what has been called rity of a case Bremridge v. Latimer report- the sting of the Libel, there is not a word ed in 12 W. R. 878 (1863) and not to be which could convey to the mind of any one! und elsewhere, these reports not getting a notion that any portion of the £2,000 into the ordinary Digests. As I do not alleged to have found its way to Lisbon had think it necessary to decide absolutely reached the hands of Senhor Ameral as a whether this plea is good or bad in form bribe or money gift to him. The tenor off or substance, I have only to remark the whole is indeed that his gratitude to- that that case was in a Common Law wards, his zeal for, his constituents, not] proceeding in an action for damages and any money bribe, had incited him, and that that that decision appears to have turned money was used, not to stimulate his zeal, on the power of Judge at Chambers or of but to further sad aid his efforts as wel the Court under the U. L. P. Act alone, to know money is used, it may be lawfully, it strike out or amend, also that the decision may be illegally, to carry elections or poli- was not on a demurrer. I must add that tical measures or railway or canal under- the rules created under the U. L. P. Act takings in England. Again, at the end of the G are confined to civil and do not extend to alleged Libel, in what is called the second criminal pleadings, and therefore 1 am far count, occurs this innuendo ("meaning as is from being persuaded that the foru inherembefore alleged of and concerning the Bull. and Leake 2 edit. of 1862 is not still false malicious and defamatory libel firstly! good pleading in criminal pleading, though hereinbefore set forth"), words which import it was in the case cited in effect disallowed all the innuendoes or it may be only the last under the C. L. P. Act. Mr Bayllar, for long junuando to the previously set out arti- the Defendant, ridiculed the dissection of ele. I might further exemplify the groundst his plea by Mr Pollard and submitted that for this view as to the innuendoes, but it is taken as a whole it was a full answer to the enough for me to say that on the whole I information, which he contended consisted think the information bad by reason of the in form and in substance of one count only. innuendoes going beyond a mere videlicet, But he was less careful to sustain his own and that the judgment of the Court ought plea than to attack the information, which to be against the information on that ground he insisted was bad, for that, taken by This objection, though technical, is still themselves, the two articles were simply applicable to this, which is a Criminal pro- fair comment on the public conduct of secution. If the proceedings against this public men in reference to matters of the Defendant had been an action for the libel greatest public interest, and still more by by Senhor Amaral the objection would not reason that the meaning put on the libel by hold, because the C. L. Proe, Act provides the innuendoes was such as the language a remedy for such an error in pleading. would not and could not bear, and conse-Even in a civil action before that act this quently that I must decide against it. objection applied. Now the necessity for I must say, I strongly incline to think the clause applicable to civil procedure con- that both counts of the information (if in- firms the rule as to Criminal proceedings deed they are so framed as to be two counts, and chews that the Legislature, whilst as to which I give uo opinion) are bad, and altering the rule as to civil causes, intended the Attorney General is bound by the to confinne the strict technical rule in meaning he puts on the alleged libel by the Criminal prosecutions for libel. innuendoes now; to nse the words of the It seems to me that the parties have been Chief Justice Tindal, it is a clear rule of perplexed by rules of pleading, the Acting law that an innuendo cannot introduce a Attorney General in reference to his in meaning broader than that which the words uendoes and the Defondaut as to the par- naturally bear, unless connected with pro-ticularity of his plea, and especially by per introductory averments. The well- Bremridge v. Latimer and days have been known case of flawkes v. Haurkey, 8 East wasted in argument when any common 427, is the best illustration of this rule," sense procedure could and would have easily Alexander v. Angle in Error 1, Crompton defined-nobody doubted the real issue and Jervis 143 and see 5 East 467-469. 1 between the parties with certainty and incline to think that the innuendocs here do precision. The English pleading procedure throughout introduce meanings broader has been abandoned everywhere under than the words bear. It is unnecessary for British Rule in Asia except in this Colony. me to consider whether any averments In ludia another system prevails, and for could have cured this defect.
the Consular Courts of China and Japan
It seems to me that the words of the al-the Foreign Office has wisely prescribed a Jeged libel are incapable of the meaning as system of admirable rules as to procedure cribed to them in the innuendoes in the infor- which simplifies the preliminary proccei-
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